The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone- an example for the Middle East

On 15th July 2009, the Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) came into force, thirteen years after it officially opened for signature, with the twenty-eighth ratification by Burundi. The process of establishing the African NWFZ began in the aftermath of French nuclear tests in Algeria.
 
In 1964, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) made its Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. From the 1970s on, the threat to other African states from South Africa's nuclear weapons programme- developed with Western support- is generally seen as being decisive to the delay in implementing the Cairo Declaration.
 
Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, and South Africa's renunciation and complete dismantlement of its nuclear arsenal, experts from the OAU and UN were able to negotiate the Pelindaba Treaty.
 
The treaty covers the whole African continent, including the surrounding islands, and establishes legally binding obligations prohibiting the development, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. The treaty also prohibits nuclear testing, the dumping of radioactive waste and the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of any of the treaty's member states.
 
The treaty commits its parties to employ the highest standard of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities, and equipment and prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations within the zone. Significantly, the African NWFZ also promotes the virtues of civil nuclear energy and Africa's sovereign right to it.1
 
With the establishment of the Pelindaba Treaty, Africa joined existing NWFZs in Latin America, the South Pacific, Central and Southeast Asia and Antarctica, in effect making the entire Southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons. NWFZs are thus concrete examples of the countries of the global south fulfilling their international responsibilities- setting an important precedent for the nuclear-armed states of the north.
 
However, these zones’ nuclear weapon free status will be provisional so long as nuclear weapon states, in particular the US, UK, France and Russia, maintain their nuclear arsenals and do not give unequivocal security guarantees to NWFZ members. In contrast, members of NWFZs have demonstrated their commitment to cooperate with one another in order to 'fully implement the principles and objectives of the treaties'.2
 
With regards to the great powers, a key challenge facing the African NWFZ is the status of Diego Garcia (pictured above). Whilst the African Union (AU) regards this territory as 'an integral part of Mauritius', the UK claims the islands as its own and therefore not subject to the treaty.3
 
Since 1965, having forcibly removed its population, the UK has controlled Diego Garcia and has allowed the US to use it as a military base. Peter H. Sand describes how 'the movement of nuclear-tipped missiles to and from the island by ships or aircraft is now considered ‘use of the facility in normal circumstances''.4
 
Therefore, because neither the US nor the UK recognise Diego Garcia as being subject to the Pelindaba Treaty, Mauritius will not be able to meet its treaty obligations. Were the UK to accept that Diego Garcia should be included in the African NWFZ and if the US ratified Protocol III of the Pelindaba Treaty, the US would not be able to keep nuclear weapons in its military base there. Russia will not sign any treaty protocols until convinced that the US is not using its base as a nuclear weapons site.
 
If the shared goals of the African NWFZ and other NWFZs are to be fully realised, it is therefore crucial that NWFZ principles and objectives are supported by the nuclear weapon states. The NWFZ model will also need to spread internationally, for example to the Korean peninsula and the Middle East, joining with other disarmament instruments in order to establish a global treaty banning nuclear weapons.
 
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Egypt agreed a package with the US for taking proposals for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) forward, including a regional conference in 2012, though Israel later expressed its opposition to the plan.5
 
The 1995 resolution on establishing a Middle East WMDFZ was integral to the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT, with Egypt and other Arab states' increasing frustration at the lack of progress on this making it a critically important issue. Furthermore, whilst Egypt strongly supports the Pelindaba Treaty, it has not ratified it because of the Israeli nuclear threat.
 
South Africa's experience of giving up its nuclear weapons, joining the NPT and helping to create the African NWFZ provides an important example of how Israel could disarm and reorient its foreign policy towards more peaceful ends. To this end, it is worth noting the similarities and crossover between Israel and South Africa's nuclear weapons programmes.
 
These programmes can be counted as part of the West's development of nuclear capabilities after World War 2, benefiting from Western nation's technological, financial and political support.
 
Between the mid-1960s and 1980s South Africa and Israel, both then regarded as 'pariah states', also co-operated on nuclear matters.6 And, as with Israel today, South Africa maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, where its arsenal was not acknowledged or denied.
 
South Africa's decision to disarm was taken in 1989, at a time when its regional relations (i.e. with Angola and Namibia) were improving. South Africa also needed to placate the international community following the easing of tensions as the Cold War ended. Furthermore, the apartheid government were concerned that, if the ANC assumed power, they would control a nuclear arsenal.
 
Today Israel argues that its regional security concerns must be met before it can move towards disarmament. Thus, as Merav Datan points out, if the Middle East appears to be 'an increasingly hostile neighbourhood', Israel has 'even less incentive to actively pursue regional WMD disarmament'.7
 
Israel's security should be carefully considered, but this must be done in relation to the security of the other nations of the region- including Iran. Thus, according to a recent poll of Arab public opinion by the Brookings Institution, when asked to name the 'two countries posing the greatest threat to you' 88% chose Israel, 77% the US- with only 10% naming Iran.8
 
Moreover, as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told a Senate committee in 2006, Iran is 'surrounded by powers with nuclear weapons - Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the north, the Israelis to the west and us in the Persian Gulf'.9 The US and its allies are now increasing their threats of military action against Iran over its uranium enrichment activities. Such threats violate the UN Charter and only further inflame the region, handicapping progress towards peace, disarmament and a WMDFZ.10
 
(A version of this article appeared in Swedish IPPNW's journal 'Läkare mot kärnvapen')
 
 

1 African Union (1996), OAU- African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

2 United Nations (2010), Outcome Document- Second Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 30th April, para. 36

3 OAU Resolutions (1980), Res. 99 (XVII)

4 Peter H. Sand, 'Diego Garcia: British–American Legal Black Hole in the Indian Ocean?', Journal of Environmental Law, January 2009

5 Rebecca Johnson, 'NPT: Challenging the Nuclear Power's Fiefdom', Open Democracy, 15th June 2010

6 'Revealed: How Israel offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons', The Guardian, 24th May 2010

7 Merav Datan, in 'Beyond Arms Control', Reaching Critical Will, p.79

8 '2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll', Brookings Institution, August 2010, p.62

9 'Incoming US Defense Secretary tells Senate panel Israel has nuclear weapons', Haaretz, 7th December 2006

10 Noam Chomsky, 'The Iranian Threat', ZSpace, June 28th 2010